Introduction
The success or failure of military forces in armed conflicts depends on various factors. One such factor is the approach to controlling troops and conducting military operations appropriate for the situation, known as mission command (Tolman, 2020). Mission command is a complex notion based on several principles that revolve around establishing trust between commanders and subordinate officers, open communication, understanding, guidance, and intent (Tolman, 2020). This case study is dedicated to the analysis of Operation Anaconda, which was carried out in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan in March 2002. It is argued that the operation was a success despite the involved forces failing to act in accordance with such principles of mission command as risk assessment, mission command, and disciplined initiative.
Operation Anaconda Summary
Operation Anaconda was one of the largest US-led combat operations in the history of the war in Afghanistan. A joint exercise of the US military and friendly Afghan forces, the operation aimed to drive out the Taliban and al Qaeda forces from the Shahikot Valley (Kugler, 2007). Although it was initially conceived as a three-day battle involving ground forces with light air support, the failure of the Afghan ground troops to enter the valley resulted in a seventeen-day battle (Kugler, 2007). According to Kugler (2007), the operation is associated with several mistakes concerning initial intelligence estimates of the enemy’s forces, the multi-headed US command structure, the reliance on the friendly Afghan troops, and air strike coordination. Despite the controversies, operation Anaconda was a success and is often used in military training worldwide as an example that military forces can learn from (Gilchrist, 2022). Overall, the conduct of the operation greatly informed future US-led military operations in the war in Afghanistan and other military conflicts.
Mission Command Principles
In order to understand how Anaconda was led to fruition, it is vital to consider the principles of mission command and their application during the operation. The principle of competence demands commanders and subordinates to be tactically and technically competent, with expertise developed through education and training provided by the institution and self-development (Tolman, 2020). The tenets of mutual trust and shared understanding concern collective confidence between all parties, including commanders, subordinates, and partner forces, and promote awareness through the continuous sharing of information (Tolman, 2020). The commander’s intent doctrine supports these standards and mandates clear communication of intent to the lowest levels in the chain of command (Tolman, 2020). Meanwhile, the principle of mission orders requires orders for military operations to be constructed based on the commander’s intent, desired outcomes, and essential subordinate tasks, with disciplined initiative describing the duty of soldiers to carry out given commands (Tolman, 2020). The final principle, risk acceptance, requires commanders to carefully assess and mitigate risks associated with individual military operations (Tolman, 2020). Overall, the principles of mission command are crucial in conducting modern military operations.
Mission Command Principles in Operation Anaconda
To understand Operation Anaconda’s initial setback and eventual successful completion, each of the described principles of mission command should be examined. The operation at issue was led by a multi-headed command structure consisting of a central command (CENTCOM), Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) (Kugler, 2007). Furthermore, the command in the country included the Army’s Fifth Special Operations Group and Combined Air Operations Center (Kugler, 2007). It can be argued that the commanders and subordinates of the involved centers possessed the necessary competencies and expertise, as the report does not indicate otherwise (Kugler, 2007). In contrast, the friendly Afghan forces recruited for the operation lacked training for multi-unit operations and other tactical maneuvers (Kugler, 2007). It should be noted that command of different forces was granted to command centers at varying times, leading to delays and failure to establish a unity of command during the preparation stage (Kugler, 2007). Although the operation was headed by several commanders, it can be argued that the commander’s intent to clear the valley of enemy forces was clear and adequately communicated to subordinates, establishing shared understanding.
Despite the explicit goal of Operation Anaconda, the competency deficiencies of the Afghan troops led to their inability to carry out mission orders and, consequentially, the failure to uphold mutual trust and disciplined initiative. However, the oversight that translated into the need for the operation strategy to be tactically adapted to the new combat circumstances lies within the principle of risk acceptance. The planning of the operation was compromised by inaccurate intelligence of enemy capabilities as the joint Taliban and al Qaeda troops possessed greater numbers of heavy weaponry than expected (Kugler, 2007). The command did not account for this risk, leading to the ground US forces being underequipped and unprepared to answer enemy fire effectively. In addition, failure to calculate for stronger enemy forces resulted in insufficient involvement of air forces that “could make up any unanticipated deficiency in firepower” (Kugler, 2007, p. 10). Initial failure in risk assessment notwithstanding, the joint Afghan and US forces succeeded in their plans with minimal casualties due to the shared understanding and mutual trust between ground and air forces in coordinating attacks.
Conclusion
In summary, operation Anaconda, one of the most significant battles in the war in Afghanistan, is an example of the ability of the military to adapt to changing battle circumstances despite the initial oversights. The allied forces failed to account for all risks of the operation and secure additional firepower, with training deficiencies on the part of the friendly Afghan party leading to the operation being prolonged. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the ability to quickly reassess the situation and follow such tenets of mission command as shared understanding and commander’s intent lead to the eventual accomplishment.
References
Gilchrist, M. (2022). Is the Australian defence force joint enough? Australian Army Journal, 18(1), 1-16. Web.
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. The Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Web.
Tolman, F. N. (2020). Mission command: A senior enlisted leader’s perspective. NCO Journal, 1-5. Web.