Introduction
The classification of Uganda as an electoral autocracy dates back to 1996. The score of 0.19 in 1990 and the score of 0.23 in 2020 for Uganda’s liberal democracy have not considerably changed, and Uganda has not made any significant improvements (Christensen and Latin 54). The six indices that make up the liberal democratic measure—freedom of association, judicial restraints on the executive, equality before the law and individual rights, legislative restraints on the executive, fair elections, and freedom of expression and the media—were used to obtain this score. Since the beginning of the millennium, Uganda has lagged behind Tanzania and Kenya in advancing liberal democratic institutions. Compared to the South Saharan average, it scores 0.11 (Christensen and Laitin 410). Uganda has constantly been rated lower than the sub-Saharan average since the early 1990s, while Burundi, South Sudan, and Rwanda continue to rank higher than Uganda.
The first elections in Uganda were held soon after the nation acquired independence in 1962. With the emergence of political parties like the Uganda National Congress, the nation’s Liberal Democracy Score was going upward between the 1950s and the early 1960s (UNC). The growing trend lasted until the late 1960s when a sharp downhill trend started because the country’s then-president of Uganda suspended the constitution and proclaimed himself to be the executive head of state. Idi-coup Amin of Obote became the nation’s new President, causing Uganda’s Liberal Democracy score to continue declining from the late 1960s until 1980. Parliament was abolished, no elections were held, and the judiciary and press were subjected to the administration’s whims once Idi Amin declared himself President. Idi Amini was deposed in 1979 by Tanzanian and Uganda National Liberation Front soldiers, which opened the door for Amini’s former boss Obote to win reelection as the nation’s next President in late 1980.
It appears that the country’s Liberal Democracy Score did not experience any significant changes until current president Museveni assumed office in 1986. Museveni ended human rights abuse toward civilians, initiated significant political liberalization and general press freedom, and insisted on broad economic reforms. With these adjustments, the nation’s score began to rise slowly but steadily from the early 1990s. Therefore, the article will examine the successes and failures of promoting democracy in Uganda since 1962. Even though Uganda is regarded as a democratic nation, it appears to be stuck in the middle of the democratic growth process, which is why this research topic was thought to be highly fascinating. It impacts its institutions and the overall transfer of power process.
The State of Democracy in Uganda Today
Although it still faces many democratic issues, Uganda is regarded as a democratic nation today. As much as Uganda is considered democratic, there are several flaws in her governance and institutional frameworks that one may use to argue against her status as a democratic state. The main argument is based on two main issues: the administration’s manipulation of processes and institutions and the lack of adequate power separation among the three main branches of government (judiciary, executive, and legislature). Starting with the Electoral Commission of Uganda is crucial since free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. An independent election commission is reportedly present in Uganda. In 1980, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011, the Ugandan Electoral Commission organized five national elections after independence (Dhizaala 75). However, the extent to which it conducted a free and fair election has drawn much criticism. The electoral commission’s independence from the executive branch is further questioned and criticized by the President’s choice of members and finances of the institution.
The type of leadership in the region dramatically influences a country’s stability. In contrast to the Election Theory, which holds that democratic states may change their administrations through open, competitive elections and permit regime changes, Uganda’s situation appears to be different (Dhizaala 73). Although it was expected that Uganda’s 2005 reintroduction of multiparty politics would pave the way for political engagement and democratic electoral procedures, the practices appear to have remained stern in the past, and a democratic culture of modifying the top leadership remains a distant dream. First, the government has consistently disregarded proposals to establish an independent National Electoral Commission. It has also failed to implement electronic voter registration to minimize election manipulation and ballot box stuffing significantly.
Most crucially, Uganda’s effete government increased the extent of bribery and vote buying to previously unheard-of levels. Second, it is crucial to assess the character of justice by considering how reliable and impartial the judiciary is. The idea of the judiciary’s independence derives from the separation of powers, which states that the three parts of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—must be independent and different from one another (Dhizaala 77). For example, the Chief Justice of Uganda, who also serves as a Supreme Court judge, oversees and manages all of the country’s courts.
The Parliament of Uganda (Legislative arm of government) is a further significant entity that has to be examined. Uganda has a multiparty form of government; hence its Parliament is made up of representatives from several political parties. The Parliament of Uganda28, whose members are chosen by secret vote and with the support of the general adult franchise, is another significant institution. Although it has sometimes fallen short of voter expectations, Uganda’s Parliament has efficiently carried out its constitutionally mandated duties. Most of the time, this is attributable to politicians who are only interested in their short-term goals or constantly seek favors from the highest authority (the President). The majority of the ruling party members in the house have historically been interpreted as approval of the government’s programs by Parliament (French78). Other connected difficulties have to do with legislation unkind to human rights.
The current Population Order Bill is an excellent example. It was approved despite strong opposition from the media, civil society, opposition parties, and a large portion of the general public. The bill, backed by President Yoweri Museveni’s ruling NRM party, was approved despite protests inside and outside the House of Representatives. It is a blatant example of a multiparty democracy still in its infancy and of respect for human rights, particularly the right to free expression and political involvement.
Why Uganda Experiences Low-Quality Democracy
Since the early 1990s, Uganda’s democracy has regularly been scored at 0.23, somewhat lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, which is 0.3. The persistent violation of residents’ human rights by the security forces is blamed for the country’s lagging democratic developments. Although this may be the case in certain sub-Saharan African nations, based on Uganda’s score, it unquestionably appears to be worse. Even if there are continuous electron cycles in Uganda, sub-Saharan Africa still lags in guaranteed civil freedoms, checks on the ruler, and minority rights. For example, in Uganda, opposition candidates run in election cycles, but the President, who has held office for more than 30 years, consistently prevails (French 308). It is because the nation’s election system has always been utilized to impose single-party presidential control on the people. In contrast, opposition candidates have won the majority of seats in elections from 1970 until the late 2000s.
The zero-sum politics of the postcolonial leadership had a remarkable impact on Uganda The country faced intolerance under one-party control in the 1960s, the notorious and lethal military dictatorship of Idi Amin in the 1970s, and the unpredictable and conflict-ridden leadership of the second Obote regime in the 1980s. Since 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) administration has contributed to restoring some form of democratic authority. However, some pro-government activists have worked hard to portray opposition groups as malicious.
The NRM not only painted parties as factionalist, divisive, and narrow-minded but also blamed them for everything that had gone wrong in the nation in the past. It was in addition to the NRM’s assertion that it was a substitute for the party-based systems. In hindsight, the multiparty democracy that was first established at the moment of independence has been destroyed (Malikane and Chitambara 95). Although the political elite in Uganda still views democracy with distrust, the liberal tradition views it as the right of the populace to organize and select their government via an organized multiparty system. During most of the postcolonial period, parties were either restricted by the governments of the day or outlawed altogether. During Idi Amin’s administration (1971–1979), Uganda saw its worst economic mismanagement and totalitarian leadership.
Life was harsh and brief during the 1970s and the early half of the 1980s. The nine years of Idi Amin’s dictatorship left a scar on Ugandan history. The errors made by Milton Obote, Idi Amin’s predecessor, led to his rise to power. The democratic constitution of 1962 was discarded by Milton Obote’s first postcolonial administration, which also weakened the opposition, and was replaced by a hurriedly constructed constitution in 1966. As a result, alternative organizations were stifled, kingdoms were abolished, and a one-party system began to take hold. One way to describe the time after Amin is as an unstable time. The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) administration was accused of manipulating the 1980 elections. There was also an insurgency and a struggling economy in most of the nation’s regions. The postcolonial history of Uganda has, in essence, been devoid of democratic administration. The conditions needed to develop a multiparty political culture have not been favorable.
Like many other African nations, Uganda’s post-independence era was marked by trends toward monopoly politics, and the UPC administration in power made every effort to erode political plurality. As a result, multiparty democracy was brief. The political gloom that Uganda has experienced in the postcolonial era is attributable to the country’s failed multiparty democracy. Politics in other nations that tolerated democratic plurality have often been stable, and their economies have advanced. It seems erroneous to claim, as some scholars have, that multiparty politics is to blame for sectarian strife and a lack of social progress. There is a ton of evidence suggesting the most affluent time in Uganda was during the first postcolonial administration when multiparty politics flourished.
In addition to economic security and political responsibility, social service delivery was effective and efficient. The country’s troubles started in 1967 when Obote postponed elections, revoked the constitution, and moved the nation closer to a one-party state. These were the arguments Idi Amin used to convince the military to depose Milton Obote in a coup in 1971. During Idi Amin’s military dictatorship (1971–1979), where military officers and marshal law were in charge, the hopes of fostering multiparty democracy were further thrown out the window. There were no signs of democracy or any other type of citizen involvement in government under that rule.
State of Democracy in Africa as a Whole
For the first time in over a decade, the proportion of nations classified as authoritarian by global democracy indexes has surpassed that of countries classified as democratic. Many African nations have seen a steady deterioration in their democratic standards, likely to last for some time. For example, in 1985, there were 42 authoritarian regimes and 3 democracies; by 2015, the number of democracies was 22—its highest point to date—undermining an otherwise impressive increase in democracy across the continent (Dhizaala 7). To the recent presidential election, there will be 18 democracies in 2020, compared to 3 hybrid ones and 19 authoritarian regimes (Christensen and Laitin 412). Detailed examination reveals a geographical pattern. South Africa, with 39%, and the West African regions, with 50%, have all but nations classed as democracies (Pelizzo and Nwokora 252). One democracy exists in the north and east Africa, and none in the seven countries that make up central Africa (Dhizaala 9). Despite certain advancements in the continent of Africa’s overall representative governance, clean election results have generally declined.
Key democratic institutions, including the courts, civil society groups, the police, and the Electoral Commission, have steadily been coopted, intimidated, or silenced in Zambia. This country looked to be moving closer to democracy in the late 1990s. Those in charge exhibit a blatant disregard for the law and intolerance for any voices of dissent. As a result, the public no longer has faith in either elected officials or the democratic system. Long-term, this rising voter indifference is seriously damaging to democracy. For example, President John Magufuli of Tanzania’s administration outlawed political gatherings and protests and took steps to imprison important opposition figures (Pelizzo and Nwokora 250). Since 2016, churches and civil society organizations have reported abductions, torture, and political killings.
In February 2018, opposition members, in desperation, marched to the European Union delegation’s headquarters in Dares Salaam, asking for security and assistance. Also, painfully evident during the past year in Africa is the necessity for the international community to reconsider its role and strategy for promoting democracy there. The spectacle surrounding Kenya’s elections and dictatorial retreat over the last year serves as a model for the deterioration of democracy in the rest of Africa. When windows of opportunity and promise are missed because a dictatorship would not relinquish control, democracy’s chances suffer.
Conclusion
Therefore, as amply demonstrated above, Uganda still has a long way to go before establishing meaningful democracy. Nevertheless, to achieve democracy, the nation’s non-disabled individuals must actively participate, not just the so-called revolutionary leaders. Five criteria must be met for Uganda to be regarded as a democratic state. Intensification and support of political leadership institutions, the growth of political parties, effective social and economic development planning, acceptance of innovation in the workplace, and, last but not least, the establishment of institutions for the collaborative promotion of democracy are among them. As predicted, the five factors mentioned above are the root of many democratic challenges individuals face in Uganda. Therefore, to remedy the issue, one must first identify its source. Political leadership institutions should not be overlooked, especially while carrying out their constitutional duties. Such forms of assistance might include providing space for creativity, technical assistance, and financial assistance.
Works Cited
Christensen, Darin, and David D. Laitin. African States since Independence: Order, Development, & Democracy. 1st edition, Yale University Press, 2019, p. 412.
Dhizaala, James Tonny. “Presidential Politics in Uganda: Driving Democracy Underground.” Australasian Review of African Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2020, pp. 70–85, Web.
French, Howard W. BORN in BLACKNESS: Africa and the Making of the Modern World. 1st edition, live right publishing Corp, 2021, p. 512.
Malikane, Christopher, and Prosper Chitambara. “Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy and Economic Growth in Southern Africa.” African Development Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2017, pp. 92–102, Web.
Pelizzo, Riccardo, and Zim Nwokora. “Party System Change and the Quality of Democracy in East Africa.” Politics & Policy, vol. 46, no. 3, 2018, pp. 28-505, Web.