Policymakers and Intelligence Conflicts

Topic: International Relations
Words: 349 Pages: 1

Despite a common goal and mutual need, policymakers often conflict with intelligence. These are the two main ideas present in the given observation: the need and the absence of sympathy (Jervis, 2017). The former can be considered self-explanatory – policymakers rule the state apparatus that hosts intelligence, whereas intelligence provides information and insights, allowing policymakers to rule in the most efficient way. However, the latter tends to require a more thorough psychological examination.

The first reason for policymakers disliking their intelligence lies in their dissatisfied needs. According to Jervis (2017), policymakers require two types of support in their activity – informational and reinforcing. Firstly, they require intelligence to provide information regarding anything of value in determining the policy, strategy, and direct actions. As mentioned earlier, this support is essential and can solely explain the existence of intelligence in the first place.

Nevertheless, more often, policymakers require assurance and reinforcement of their current policies, which intelligence struggles to provide on a constant basis. Since being unbiased and honest are the factors that make the best intelligence, it will highlight all the uncertainties, ambiguities, and weak spots of the current policies to the policymakers’ displeasure.

Another reason for many misunderstandings between the two sides of interest is the perspective on the matters at hand. Psychologically, policymakers tend to simplify and portray their decisions favorably as they carry the burden of these decisions. On the contrary, intelligence is not burdened by it – its goal is to provide the most complete and objective information regardless of the case. Consequently, policymakers can deliberately omit the facts that do not fit into their vision, which can potentially lead to a conflict of interest.

Finally, the tendency of policymakers to be overconfident about the chosen course results in dismissing the intelligence’s warnings. Policy development by itself is a resource-heavy process, which makes the thoughts of a simultaneous backup plan development psychologically unpleasant. In addition, the existence of other possibilities naturally reduces the support for the chosen course, which is viewed negatively as well. Consequently, even the most genuine propositions regarding the situation can cause dislike.

Reference

Jervis, R. (2017). How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics. Princeton University Press.