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The Middle East: Lack of Regional Order

Topic: International Relations
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Introduction

The Middle East is one of the regions that are strategically positioned to attract more investors and competitors. From a historical perspective, the region has witnessed repeated encroachments from other great powers, all interested in their resources. Additionally, it is also regarded as the spiritual epicenter for several monotheistic religions such as Islam, Judaism and Christianity.1Ideally, the region’s geographic positioning is main reason why it remains vulnerable to inter and intra state conflicts. This has, for many years, destabilized the region and any attempts to establish peace and stability have failed.

Several measures were initiated towards the end of the 20th century with the aim of establishing long-lasting regional orders. Guided by the League of Arab State, the countries adopted the idea of Arab summitry which established temporal regional order.2 This order was short-lived since countries had different priorities – Iraq chose to invade other states including Kuwait while Egypt entered into a unilateral peace deal with Israel.3 Similarly, the positions of other non-Arab players had started shifting which further complicated the matrix of arriving at a balanced solution. However, the region, to this day, continue to experience dynamic changes fueled by regional alignments – they are yet to arrive at an overriding political, security and economic structure that could help built common interest. Therefore, a regional political and security framework should be developed to help reduce the existing tensions and resolve wars while, at the same time, providing a means of sustaining healthy regional competition.

Brief History of Regional Order

The initial effort of securing regional interest was manifested through the formation of Arab League in 1945. Its main mission was to promote peace, security and stability in the region by preventing disputes and conflicts.4 Initially, it was made up of six members including Egypt which was readmitted in 1987 after being suspended for signing a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979.5 The initial close relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia helped strengthen leadership of most wealthy Arab states. It is imperative to note that Saddam Hussein was a major threat to the region and in 1990 “he challenged the Arab order by invading Kuwait” (p. 25).6 His reign generated immense fear perpetrated through numerous threats to the region. However, his removal saw a temporary resumption of the Arab summits “with a sense of complacency and assurance that an old familiar order had been restored” (p.29).7 However, this was not the case since the order continued to face invisible but serious challenges both internally and externally.

External Challenges

The external challenges were perpetrated by different players – they started intruding into the Arab region, motivated by selfish interests. For instance, during the Cold War, powerful nations such as U.S. and Soviet Union had deep-rooted influence in the Middle East.8 However, they were selective when it came to building relationships – they were interested in states along the East-West axis. It is important to note that most of the activities of these nations with the exception of the U.S.were undertaken through proxy. They avoided direct involvement in an effort to prevent unnecessary conflict with rival global powers. Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union paved way for new negotiations, Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait complicated the situation.9 In response, the U. S.deployed its military into the Middle East, a move which created hostility and enmity between players including Russia.10 The 9/11 attack further saw the U.S. mount additional pressure to the region.11It responded by sending its troops in Baghdad to deal with the Saddam regime.It is clear that unless the actors show interest in resolving the conflicts, the situation will persist for long.

The region attracted several other players such as Iran and Turkey who were keen on cementing their influence in the Middle East. Iran’s initial effort to becoming a powerful player in the region started with the introduction of the Islamic Republic in 1979. However, it failed to achieve its objective since it was overshadowed by Saddam’s influence. Regardless of this, Iran was slowly but steadily making significant inroads, especially through Lebanon.AsexplicatedbyBrun, “Iran build-up Hezbollah as a powerful Iranian proxy throughout the 1980s and beyond” (p. 12).12 However, it was not until 2003 that Iran emerged as the most influential player in Iraq following the U.S. invasion – it brought to an end the Iraqi regime.13 Iran gained additional influence after Al-Assad’s regime in Syria experienced a major uprising in 2011.14 In response, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard sent Iranian, Lebanese, and Iraqi in the region to help its close ally and, in the process strengthening its influence. As of 2016, Iran had significant influence in Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad.

Besides Iran, Turkey’s interest in solidifying its influence in the Arab world started in 2009 under the leadership of Erdoğan. For many years, Turkey had avoided the Arab-Islamic world and, instead, concentrated westward. However, in 2010, it renewed its interests by “presenting a convincing model of political democratization and economic development; a balance of traditional values and vigorous modernization projects” (p. 6).15Turkey approached Erdoğan because it had maintained a good relationship with its neighbors. The initial plan was to improve regional cooperation and integration through exports and imports. However, this did not last long and everything changed following the Arab uprisings of 2011. Erdoğan became overambitious – it saw a direct opportunity regain its position over Ankara. To achieve this, it ended up supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, destined to become a ruling party in multiple countries including Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.16 Similarly, Muslim Brotherhood, at the time, was moving closer to becoming a much influential player in Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait. Although the Muslim Brotherhood failed in its quest, Erdoğan had established a strong presence in Syria and Iraqi combined with a powerful proxy in Libya.

Internal Challenges

The greatest stumbling block towards the establishment of the regional order is believed to originate internally from the Arab uprisings of 2011. As elucidated by Joshua, the uprisings affected the stability of the region – people finally “expressed decades of pent-up frustration over unequal socioeconomic conditions and repressive political institutions”.17These events had a major impact, especially at the regional level. Firstly, the uprisings led to the collapse of several states including Libya, Yemen and Syria. This created endless opportunities for many other players, among them, Iran, Turkey, Russia and United States. The same was witnessed in several non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Houthi forces, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, ISIS, Al-Qaeda.18 At the regional level, there were major alignments between member states with the dominant being the Arab Quartet it brought together Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

The events that followed the Arab uprising played a critical role in the establishment of major relationships and alignments in Middle East, some of which exist up to today. The Arab Quartet, as mentioned previously, emerged as the new focal point of the Arab world since it controlled major economic resources needed by many states.19 At the same time, Iran had managed to establish its name due to its immense influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. All these realignments made it difficult to chart a common course.

Multi-Polar Conflicts

The era of the unpopular moment which started immediately after the Cold War, no longer has a place in the 21st century. The focus has now shifted towards multi-polar moment where several countries are emerging as having more power. In the Middle East, for instance, the war in Syria is what informed the sudden shift to the new era of multi-polar.20 While the U.S. remains to be the most superior power in the world, it is increasingly becoming more reluctant to invade other countries due the past experiences.21 For instance, its past involvement in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq has had irreparable damages to its relations with other nations. During president Obama’s reign, the military made several inroads into Asia with a notable case being Saudi Arabia – it was compelled to share its neighborhood with Iran. However, in the recent past, the U.S. has silently been withdrawing its troops in most regions and has since initiated the process of diplomatic disengagement.

A similar pattern has been replicated in China – the country has distanced itself from most activities such as providing regional security in the Middle East. According to Phillips, China’s current diplomatic engagement is based on economic interests.22While this is the case, the country has continuously avoided direct involvement – its effort “remains lodged within international organizations such as the UN.23 However, critics argue that China is one of the major economic players in the Middle East and as such, must consider being directly involved in issues such as security or consider shifting its focus elsewhere. Philips further argued that China’s investment in MENA region is less significant compared to the resources it deploys in other regions.24 This is a clear indication that the country is less interested in investing in the region.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East has been largely motivated by two critical interests – to limit the spread of instability towards its territory and maintain its influence in the energy market. The prolonged conflict in Syria saw the country become directly involved in the war from 2015 – it aimed at preventing the fall of the Syria regime. The formulization of OPEC+ agreements in the year 2016 was aimed at helping Russia strengthen its energy front. As argued by Hall, and Siamak, the agreements offered Russia a “forum in which it can effectively defend its global energy interests” (p. 60).25 As a matter of fact, Russia established long term cooperative relations with different state and non-state actors as way of securing its influence.

The main consequence of multi-polar moment, as evidenced above, is that countries that considered more powerful are increasingly becoming reluctant to deploy their resources in Middle East. Instead, more of them are directly or indirectly engaged in the region’s conflicts. For instance, Russia has repeatedly supported Assad regime staring with the deployment of military force in 2015.26 The U.S., on the other hand, supported the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) effort to recover its territory across the north that was previously under the leadership of ISIS27. Although China’s military presence in Syria is much less significant, the country seems to support the idea of reconstruction.28It is clear that all the three countries have approached conflict in Syria differently which further complicates the situation – it is one of the reasons why the war has persisted for long. As it stands, lack of a common ground between the U.S., Russia and China means that there are no constructive efforts directed at ending the conflict or finding a long-lasting solution to the problem.

Critical Evaluation of the Problem

From a critical point of view, the diagnosis for the Middle East region’s problem is ferocious. It is highly unlikely that the major players, especially the internal, will unite and chart a common course. The U.S. is increasingly becoming more reluctant when it comes to investing its resources, especially those related to security in the region. This, in return, has made actors such as Saudi Arabia ad United Arab Emirates to be more confident in their quest for dominance. Although the U.S. has, in the past, outsourced security to Israel, such measures have failed to achieve the intended outcomes.

In line with the above, Saudi Arabia, Israel and United Arabs Emirates’ decision to unit in the fight against Iran and Turkey further heightened the tension in the region. It is clear that these countries are not interested in finding a solution to conflicts – the prefer living with the chaos just like Israel.29 The recent experiences in Yemen will most likely affect Saudi Arabia’s interests of investing outside the region. This research paper, notes that the three actors and Iran are not interested in reaching consensus with any other player or allies. In fact, the efforts by Riyadh and Tel Aviv to resolve the problems among will less likely bare any fruits.

There are several powerful groups in the Middle East, specifically Iran that appear not interested in exploring the available options for peacemaking. Harrison argues that if the conflicts the country has with the likes of Syria and Lebanon were brought to an end, it will losesignificantly.30 Some of the proposals put forth Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) which was dismissed by other regional actors. HOPE, as explained by foreign minister Javad Zarif, “was based on the fact that all regional states have the responsibility to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in the region” (p. 15).31 It also aimed at establishing a joint taskforce on different issues related to practical measures to would help expand cooperation. While HOPE appears to be a well-thought-out initiative, it was dismissed by the actors citing that it failed to address the core issues, especially those of Saudi Arabia.

Possible Solutions

It is clear from the above discussion that the region requires a more effective security framework to help reducing the existing tensions, regional competition and ultimately resolve the wars between actors. This research paper emphasizes the need to focus on building regional stability without necessary focusing on a top-down approach which has failed repeatedly to yield significant outcomes. Instead, there should be mutual commitment among all actors in participating in a gradual process guided by those directly affected by the conflicts. They are in a better position when it comes to identifying the root causes of the problems affected their region. In addition to this, the strategy adopted should aim at breaking apart the regional conflicts followed by multilateral participation of influential actors – this will play a critical role towards building the needed trust to propel the negations forward. The idea here is to first bring the actors together with the aim of promoting small-scale solutions. It is imperative to note that de-escalation and conflict management are essential for creating a conducive atmosphere to commence discussions on issues such regional security.

Secondly, the process of brokering regional security should put into consideration actors’ previous efforts towards stability. For instance, Iran has, in past, focused much of its attention towards developing deep and impactful regional and multifaceted networks. In fact, forcing it to break it ties with players such as Hezbollah might see it abandon the ongoing negotiations. In fact, the Trump administration’s strategy, as revealed in Martin’s study, “served to deepen Iran’s regional reach, as Tehran ended up doubling down on the network to demonstrate strength and develop leverage in an effort to overcome the sanctions” (p. 265).32In addition to this, Tehran has managed to build strong networks while capitalizing on the exiting political crises which offered endless opportunities for outsourcing allies. Therefore, ignoring the actors’ initial plans and measures already adopted will not yield any meaningful outcomes.

Therefore, the focus should be on adopting well-coordinated agreements in areas with heightened conflicts including Iran and Tehran. The idea is to see the actors such as Tehran comprise by abandoning some of its initial initiatives for the collective good of the region. Most importantly, all the actors must first understand each has unique contributions as far the security of the region is concerned. For instance, Iran should be directly involved in all the bilateral regional discussions in areas such as Syria and Yemen. Lastly, regional empowerment economic investments will play a crucial role curbing the influence of Tehran in Iraq and Lebanon.

Conclusion

The Middle East is one of the regions that strategically positioned to attract more investors and competitors. Similarly, the region has witnessed repeated advancements from other great powers, all interested in their resources. Despite this, Middle East has continuously been embroiled in endless conflicts fueled by regional alignments. Measures to secure the region started back in 1945 through the formation of Arab League. Its main mission was to promote peace, security and stability in the region by preventing disputes and conflicts. However, there has been little progress towards establishing stability due to challenges that the region has continuously been experiencing both internally and externally. In the recent past, the multi-polar moment has been the cause many wars including the witnessed in Syria. Therefore, a regional political and security framework should be developed to help reduce the existing tensions and resolve wars while, at the same time, providing a means of sustaining healthy regional competition.

Bibliography

Brun, Itai, and Sarah Feuer. “In Search of A Regional Order: The Struggle Over The Shape Of The Middle East.” Strategic Assessment 24, no. 1 (2021): 5-20.

Emam, Mahmoud, Yasser Abdelazim, and Mogeda El-Keshky. “Grandparents in the Middle East and North Africa: Changes in identity and trajectory.” In Grandparents in cultural context, pp. 223-244. Routledge, 2017.

Gause, F. Gregory. “‘Hegemony’ Compared: Great Britain and the United States in the Middle East.” Security Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 565–87. Web.

Glombitza, Olivia, and Luciano Zaccara. “The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy Through the Iranian Lens: Initiatives of Engagement With the GCC.” The International Spectator, vol. 56, no. 4, Informa UK Limited, 2021, pp. 15–32. Web.

Hall, Michael, and SiamakSeyfi. Cultural and Heritage Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa: Complexities, Management and Practices (Contemporary Geographies of Leisure, Tourism and Mobility). 1st ed., Routledge, 2020.

Harrison, Ross. Shifts in the Middle East balance of power: An historical perspective. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2018.

Hasou, Tawfig. The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League. 1st ed., Routledge, 2019

Josua, Maria, and MirjamEdel. “The Arab Uprisings and the Return of Repression.” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 26, no. 5, Informa UK Limited, Feb. 2021, pp. 586–611. Web.

Martin, Lenore G. “Analysing a Tumultuous Relationship: Turkey and the US in the Middle East.” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 262–77. Web.

Phillips, Christopher. “The International System and the Syrian Civil War.” International Relations, vol. 36, no. 3, SAGE Publications, 2022, pp. 358–81. Web.

Valbjørn, Morten, and Raymond Hinnebusch. “Exploring the Nexus Between Sectarianism and Regime Formation in a New Middle East: Theoretical Points of Departure.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 19, no. 1, Wiley, 2019, pp. 2-22. Web.

Footnotes

  1. Emam, Mahmoud, Yasser Abdelazim, and Mogeda El-Keshky. “Grandparents in the Middle East and North Africa: Changes in identity and trajectory.” In Grandparents in cultural context, pp. 223-244. Routledge, 2017.
  2. Hasou, Tawfig. The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League. 1st ed., Routledge, 2019.
  3. Hasou. The Struggle for the Arab World, 55.
  4. Valbjørn, Morten, and Raymond Hinnebusch. “Exploring the Nexus Between Sectarianism and Regime Formation in a New Middle East: Theoretical Points of Departure.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 19, no. 1, Wiley, 2019, pp. 2–22.
  5. Valbjørn. Exploring the Nexus Between Sectarianism and Regime Formation in a New Middle East, 8.
  6. Harrison, Ross. Shifts in the Middle East balance of power: An historical perspective. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2018.
  7. Harrison. Shifts in the Middle East balance of power, 57.
  8. Gause, F. Gregory. “Hegemony’ Compared: Great Britain and the United States in the Middle East.” Security Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 565–87.
  9. Gause. Hegemony’ Compared, 566.
  10. Gause, 571.
  11. Gause, 575.
  12. Brun, Itai, and Sarah Feuer. “In Search of A Regional Order: The Struggle Over The Shape Of The Middle East.” Strategic Assessment 24, no. 1 (2021): 5-20.
  13. Brun. In Search of A Regional Order: The Struggle Over The Shape Of The Middle East, 5
  14. Brun, 4.
  15. Brun, 6.
  16. Hasou, 45.
  17. Josua, Maria, and MirjamEdel. “The Arab Uprisings and the Return of Repression.” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 26, no. 5, Informa UK Limited, 2021, pp. 586–611.
  18. Josua. The Arab Uprisings and the Return of Repression, 569.
  19. Josua, 570.
  20. Phillips, Christopher. “The International System and the Syrian Civil War.” International Relations, vol. 36, no. 3, SAGE Publications, 2022, pp. 358–381.
  21. Phillips. The International System and the Syrian Civil War, 359.
  22. Phillips, 360.
  23. Phillips, 361.
  24. Phillips, 370.
  25. Hall, Michael, and SiamakSeyfi. Cultural and Heritage Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa: Complexities, Management and Practices (Contemporary Geographies of Leisure, Tourism and Mobility). 1st ed., Routledge, 2020.
  26. Phillips, 371.
  27. Hall, and Siamak. Cultural and Heritage Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa: Complexities, 55.
  28. Hall, and Siamak, 59.
  29. Harrison, Ross. Shifts in the Middle East balance of power, 69.
  30. Glombitza, Olivia, and Luciano Zaccara. “The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy Through the Iranian Lens: Initiatives of Engagement With the GCC.” The International Spectator, vol. 56, no. 4, Informa UK Limited, 2021, pp. 15–32.
  31. Glombitza, Olivia, and Luciano Zaccara. “The Islamic Republic’s Foreign Policy Through the Iranian Lens:
  32. Martin, Lenore G. “Analysing a Tumultuous Relationship: Turkey and the US in the Middle East.” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 262–77.